MALI : La Junte craque mais ne croule pas (Par Babacar Justin Ndiaye)
The typhoon of terrorist-jihadist fires in Mali constitutes a violent shock in a mess already saturated with tremors.
The (light-dark or even grey) panorama of the ongoing fighting raises questions which, in turn, suggest answers fraught with political myopia, security failures, geopolitical missteps and diplomatic ramblings.
Since political blindness is an old problem (an endless Transition ends in the abyss), it is important to focus on the shortcomings of a system that opened the doors of Bamako and, above all, made the walls of the Minister of Defense's residence accessible.
These fatal and lethal anomalies fuel a series of doubts, suspicions, and insinuations. This is particularly true given the personality and role of the late General Sadio Camara within the Military Directorate that overthrew President IBK and then eliminated his successor, Bah Ndao.
Indeed, General Sadio Camara had weight and charisma. Before becoming an adored figure and an influential leader within the National Guard (a superbly equipped unit), the former Minister of Defense was the Director of the Military Academy.
As a side note, his daughter took the entrance exam for this military academy (the cradle of the Malian officer corps) twice without success. Proof that the father's ethics were incompatible with any form of nepotism.
It goes without saying that the circumstances surrounding the death of this pillar of Russian influence in Mali (Sadio Camara speaks Russian with the same ease as Bambara) leave observers greatly perplexed.
Especially since Goïta's solitary escape, which made him the sole master on board the ship, inevitably led to marginalization, created divisions and, inevitably, triggered headwinds during the orientation debates within the group of five Generals forming the State bunker.
It is also known that relations between General Sadio Camara and General Assimi Goïta, which were perfectly fine at the start, gradually deteriorated.
A telling detail: the size of the protection detachment for the former Minister of Defence was abruptly and drastically reduced: about fifteen soldiers for the security of the Minister of War in a country at war.
However, the mother of all questions remains: how can a truck packed with explosives drive through the capital and its conurbation and then, like a battering ram, pulverize the villa of a Minister located in a garrison town like Kati?
We are undeniably facing a cascade of incredible failures across all intelligence channels: both prefectural and military. And also, shortcomings in the operational control of the territory by the military command.
That is why a bloody purge, taking advantage of the widespread offensive by terrorists, remains a preferred hypothesis for some analysts.
Isn't it possible for a train on a level crossing to hide another railcar? It is clear that the former Malian Minister of Defense was not a man to be imprisoned like Generals Abbas Dembélé and Nama Sagara.
In any case, the death of General Sadio Camara leaves General Assimi Goïta as the sole leader now in charge. Generals Diaw, Wagué, and Koné are not in close contact with the troops on a daily basis.
Finally, regarding the grouped chapters of geostrategic missteps and diplomatic missteps, we note, of course, this sudden about-face consisting of simultaneously recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and, inevitably, thumbing its nose at Algeria. A balancing act on a very murky geopolitical terrain.
A sovereign decision, certainly, but also a gamble not without risks; because the powerful Algerian neighbour possesses capacities for harm equivalent to its potential for benefits.
Indeed, the full extent of the ambivalent effectiveness of Algerian networks on the ground is currently unfolding before our eyes. Wasn't it Algiers (contacted by Moscow) that facilitated, just a few hours ago, the evacuation of Russian mercenary-counselors from the conquered city of Kidal? It's an open secret that northern Mali is teeming with Algerian operatives.
By acting like a trapeze artist in the diplomatic field; and particularly on the thorny issue of Western Sahara, President Assimi Goïta has not fully grasped the deviousness of the French strategy.
In truth, Paris and Algiers squabble on the shores of the Mediterranean but get along like thieves at a fair in the Sahel. In this respect, collusion between the DRS and the DGSE represents a danger that Malian State Security will be unable to contain.
Clearly, President Goïta is cultivating the art of uniting his enemies and drawing their ire. France, seething with resentment and simmering with anger, is actively on the lookout. General François Lecointre, former Chief of the General Staff, reiterates unequivocally that France will return to the Sahel.
As for Algeria, which already has Morocco on its western flank, it will under no circumstances accept having the same Sharifian kingdom on its southern flank. Southern Algeria corresponds to northern Mali. Quite naturally, the Algerian army fears being strategically sandwiched or trapped.
The conclusion unfolds in a manner that is both questioning and forward-looking. Does the weekend's conflagration, ignited by a conglomerate of national rebels and cosmopolitan terrorists, hasten the end of a Transition that refuses to be transitional?
The answer is taking shape in the outlines of a new political force (the post-Goïta era) which is being formed through a Civil-Military Transition Committee (CTCM) that is almost entirely without figures. Even though Imam Mahmoud Dicko, in exile in Algiers, provides the right or the consensus-building profile.
Should we sell, too quickly and too soon, the skin of a bear that is physically intact and temporarily untraceable?
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