The second open letter from former Minister of State Abdou Fall to President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, entitled "For Institutional Refounding and Democratic Clarification" and published on June 7, 2027, has the merit of opening a useful debate on the latent crisis of our political system. It poses a central question: do Senegalese institutions still reflect the reality of power? While entirely legitimate, this question alone seems insufficient to fully grasp the ongoing transformations.

My elder brother begins with a political diagnosis. He observes the tensions, ambiguities, and imbalances arising from the current power structure. For my part, the approach should stem from a different issue: that of institutional dysfunctions, legal certainty, and the continuity of the regular functioning of a state entangled in a multifaceted crisis.

Indeed, a political crisis only becomes dangerous when it transforms into an institutional crisis. And an institutional crisis becomes explosive when it is compounded by an economic, social, and diplomatic crisis. This is precisely where Abdou Fall's text falls short, due to its incomplete analysis of the current situation.

He calls for a complete overhaul, but doesn't clearly state how it should be carried out. What would be the legal framework for this reform? Should it involve national consultation, political dialogue with key stakeholders, a constituent assembly, or a parliamentary revision if a referendum is not possible?

Moreover, the proposed solutions do not precisely define the responsibilities and roles of the traditional opposition and the neo-opposition that Pastef wants to embody while continuing to participate in the exercise of power through the presence of its activists and allies in the machinery of the State (General Directorates, Boards of Directors and other Supervisory Boards, etc.).

He also mentions democratic clarification, but without specifying its format, duration, stakeholders, guarantees, or implementation mechanism. However, in a Republic, good intentions are not enough. Procedures, deadlines, responsibilities, and validation mechanisms are necessary. At this level, the analysis should incorporate the issue of holding upcoming elections (local elections, early legislative elections, and referendums, if necessary) within the framework of a new electoral code and a different voting system that takes into account major reforms aimed at rebalancing national and local institutions.

In my opinion, his analysis also lacks two essential dimensions: the judicial resolution of disputes in the National Assembly and the political economy of the crisis. Senegal is not simply experiencing institutional tension. It is facing a crisis of justice and an acute economic and social crisis, budgetary constraints, a demand for financial credibility, and a delicate relationship with its diplomatic, financial, and technical partners; all within a context of excessively high social expectations.

Any deep institutional reform, if poorly conducted, can exacerbate the political divide, institutional uncertainty, worry investors, weaken negotiations with partners and further undermine citizens' confidence.

The question is therefore not simply: what kind of institutions do we want?

The real question is: how to reform institutions without disrupting the state, paralyzing the economy, fracturing society, and further isolating Senegal?

That is why the debate should be broadened around five requirements.

First, a rigorous institutional diagnosis must be established: identifying violations of the principles of the rule of law, ambiguities within the majority, overlaps of power, and weaknesses revealed by recent practice. In this instance, the conclusions of the Mbow Commission could serve as a basis for discussion.

Secondly, define a time-limited, inclusive but structured framework for consultation, involving institutions, political parties, civil society, academics, local authorities, trade unions, employers and key stakeholders.

Thirdly, specify the architecture of the transition: how to ensure governance during the transitional phase of the reforms, according to which mechanisms, with which actors and what guarantees of continuity of the State?

Fourth, integrate economic and social issues: economic and social program, debt, public finances, partner confidence, business climate, efficiency and stability of public policies, employment and cost of living

Fifth, provide for a democratic validation mechanism: either by referendum, or by a concerted legislative procedure, preceded by a transparent national debate.

Institutional reform must not be a slogan. It must be a method.

It must not be used to mask a political crisis solely to reconcile current antagonisms. It must restore the authority of the State, the primacy of the Constitution, the confidence of citizens, and Senegal's international credibility.

It is at this level that the debate with Abdou Fall deserves to be continued and broadened to include all those who have deserted the public space because of the violence of the remarks: not to contest the usefulness of his diagnosis, but to help take a further step; that of moving from political observation to institutional, economic and democratic engineering.

Because a Republic is not refounded simply with general ideas. It is rebuilt with rules, institutions, solid guarantees, a timetable and a political will assumed by responsible actors aware of the gravity of the crisis.

Babacar Gaye

Former Minister of State

Leader of Mankoo Mucc